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Hempelman: Evidence - Wyoming's New Missing Witness Rule - Seyle v. State
EVIDENCE- Wyoming's New Missing Witness Rule. Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d
1081 (Wyo. 1978).

In early January, 1977, two-year-old Christopher Phillips died from a severe, blunt blow to the back of his head.1
The boy's stepfather, Irving E. Seyle, claimed that on the
morning of his death Christopher had urinated in his pants
and, for this, he spanked him and put him on the toilet. After
a short time the child wet his pants again; Seyle punished
him a second time, making him stand in a doorway, facing a
doorjamb. According to Seyle, the child soon began shaking
and convulsing, then he fell backwards, hitting his head on
the floor. 2 The boy was rushed to the hospital and given
emergency treatment, but he died within the hour. Seyle was
eventually charged with first degree murder.
At trial, the attending physician testified that he had
noticed multiple bruises on the deceased's forehead and
neck, and behind each ear. He also indicated that the effect
of the child's head injury might be compared to hitting one's
head against a solid wall at a speed of thirty-five to forty
miles per hour.3 Another witness testified that Seyle had
told her he would "beat the child to death if he wouldn't be
potty trained."' 4 The accused's wife did not testify for her
husband, but the accused stated at trial that his wife had
been in the bathroom, and evidently very near the child, at
the time of his alleged fall.5 Seyle was ultimately found guilty of manslaughter, and was sentenced to not less than
seven years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.!
On appeal, the defendant urged that the prosecuting attorney had committed plain and reversible error by commenting on the failure of the defendant's wife to testify in
her husband's behalf. 7 Objection to the comment was raised
Copyright ©1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1978).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 1083. Seyle related this series of events to an ambulance driver, an attending
physician, a military police officer and to the jury.
Id at 1084.
Brief for Appellee at 4.
Seyle v. State, supra note 1, at 1084.
Brief for Appellant at 2.
State v. Seyle, supra note 1, at 1085 n. 1. The relevant portion of the prosecutor's
argument is as follows:
She's never told us the story of what happened. I speculate she didn't
want to get on this witness stand, when I started cross-examining her as
to why she would stand idly by and permit these things to be done to this
child. It puts a mother in a pretty difficult position, because there is no explanation-it's not normal. So, are we dealing with a normal mother? I
submit to you, we are not.
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for the first time on appeal. 8 The Wyoming Supreme Court
affirmed,9 concluding that, in view of his claim of innocence,
Seyle's testimony suggested this his wife might naturally be
expected to testify for him. Thus, the failure of the accused
to produce his wife as a witness was proper subject for prosecutorial comment. 10 Argument of the inference was permitted notwithstanding the fact that Seyle's wife, was, accord-

ing to law, available to both parties.11
The right to comment on the failure of one's adversary
to call a material witness is well-established. When, however,
as in Seyle v. State, this right encounters a confusing body of
law regarding spousal immunities, re-evaluation of each area
of law is perhaps necessary. Both are, in fact, in something of
a state of flux; both, as some critics assert, are not without
certain shortcomings.
THE "MISSING WITNESS RULE"

HistoricalBackground
Courts have, for years, permitted comment on the failure of a party to call a witness who would "naturally have
been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant."12 The propriety of drawing adverse inferences from
such "conduct evidence" has, in fact, been a recognized principal of law since 1722, when the famous case of the Chimney
8.

9.

10.
11.
12.

The defendant advanced two other arguments on appeal, both of which had been
brought to the court's attention either before or during trial. First, the defendant
asserted that the probative value of certain photographs of the child's body, admitted into evidence at trial, was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. The photographs were understandibly rather gruesome, and the coloration of the bruises
shown in some of them was acknowledged by expert testimony to have been different from the color observed on the day of the child's death. Citing State v.
Tafoya, 101 Ariz. 424, 454 P.2d 569 (1969) the court held that the photographs could
be admitted at the trial court's discretion, even if changes in the object photographed had occurred between the time of the incident and the taking of the photos.
The court, however, indicated that such changes must be sufficiently explained to
the jury.
Secondly, the defendant argued that the evidence failed to prove that he struck
the fatal blow, or did so in a sudden heat of passion or as a result of culpable negliFence. On this issue the court held that the observations of expert witnesses regardng the head injury were inconsistent with the defendant's assertion that the child
had collapsed, and that the jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant
struck the fatal blow with the requisite criminal intent.
Since the objection was not brought to the attention of the court below, the appellate court invoked the "plain error doctrine." The doctrine states that unless the
trial court committed plain error in their deliberations, the decision of the court will
not be reversed when material objections are raised for the first time on appeal. See
Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 49(b). See also Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1977).
Seyle v. State, supra note 1, at 1083.
Id at 1086.
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 285 (3rd ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
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Sweeper's Jewel was decided.'" In that case, a sweep found a
jewel and left it with an appraiser; the appraiser refused to
return it. The English court ruled that if the jewel were not
produced, the highest possible value would be inferred. 4 Today, as then, the party's conduct is construed to indicate
that he is fearful of unveiling something or someone unfavorable to his cause.'5 If, after all, the non-producing party
knows of facts favorable to his claim, one might naturally expect him to produce them.' 6 The modern "missing witness
rule" permits a party to argue the fact of his adversary's failure to produce an apparently key witness to the jury."1
As a general proposition, the non-testifying witness
must have been "peculiarly available" to the party against
whom the inference is directed.' 8 The requirement has two
levels of meaning. A handful of jurisdictions have permitted
comment only if the witness is inaccessible to the party arguing the inference. 19 Implicit in this interpretation is the notion that the inference is permitted only because the commenting party cannot call the missing witness. The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted this approach in State v.
Spears,20 a 1956 murder case. There the inference was permitted because the defendant's wife, an alleged witness to
the incident, was not called upon to testify for her husband.
The witness was, according to Wyoming law, privileged
against testifying for the prosecution. 2
The greater number of jurisdictions, however, give the
concept of peculiar availability more liberal treatment.
These courts look to relationships and expectations of testi13. Armory v. Delamire, 1 Strange 505 (1722).
14. 2 WIGMORE J 285.
15. I&
16. Attorney-General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 316, 134 N.E. 407, 423 (1922), quoted
in 2 WIOMORE § 289, at 172.
17. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (18931.
18. See note, Permissive Inference from the Nonproduction of Equally Available Witnesses, 73 DIcK. L. REV. 337, 338 (1968-1969).
19. State v. Wallach, 389 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1965).
20. 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551 (1956).
21. The applicable statute at the time of the decision was Wyo. STAT. § 3-2605 (1945).
The current statute, essentially unchanged, is WYo. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1977).
Strictly speaking, the defendant's wife was not totally inaccessible to the prosecution. The prosecutor could have called the defendant's wife to the stand, but the
defense could then invoke its privilege against inter-spousal testimony. The
language of these statutes, it is true, makes no reference to privilege; both statutes
speak in mandatory terms. However, subsequent cases indicate that a spouse is
merely privileged against testifying, and not wholly incompetent. See Chamberlain
v. State, 348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1960). Also, companion statutes to both of these provisions. Wyo. STAT. § 3-2602 (1945) and Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-107 (1977), refer to privilege
in their titles.
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mony in making their determination.22 If, assuming the nonproducing party's claims in the controversy were true, the
witness would naturally be expected to testify for him, comment on the failure to produce the witness is deemed proper. The witness may, moreover, be accessible to both parties-and24 yet retain his status as a "peculiarly available"
witness.
It is, conversely, sometimes stated that if the witness is
"equally available" to both parties, no inference springs
from the failure of a party to call him. 5 Some courts apply
the rule literally; these courts assume that since either party
can subpoena the witness, the inference is simply unnecessary." Others indicate that the requirement admits of certain exceptions-in situtations, again, in which the missing
witness would naturally be expected to testify for the nonproducing party. 7 The court in the instant case carved out
precisely this exception.28 Thus, Seyle marks an abandonment of the Spears rule and a turn to a broader mode of analysis.
McCormick's observations on equal availability are stated in somewhat different terms. He explains that if the failure of either party to call a particular witness gives rise to an
inference against both parties in equal proportions, the inference should not be permitted.29 If the inference will "cut both
ways," neither inference has any ultimate persuasive value.
The inference is therefore improper."0 But McCormick cites
the proposition without endorsing it and instead, he takes it
22.
23.

Note, supra note 18, at 340.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 272 (McNaughton Rev. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK].

State v. Collins, 350 Mo. 291, 165 S.W.2d 647 (1942).
MCCORMICK § 272.
The assumption is ill-founded. A prosecutor may decide for various reasons not to
use evidence which could conceivably advance the State's case. The fact that the
prosecution does not call a particular witness does not make the defendant's failure
to produce the witness any less telling. Since the possibility exists that the witness
may, in fact, hurt the prosecution's case, it is highly unlikely that the prosecutor
would take the initiative of calling the witness. And by the time the prosecution is
certain the defense will not call the witness-that being at the close of the defendant's case in rejoinder-the opportunity for the prosecution to call the witness will
have passed. See United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.).
27. U. S. v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.).
Sometimes the exceptions to the rule are not actually cast in the form of exceptions. Courts often conclude that despite the accessibility of the witness to both parties, the evidence suggests that the witness cannot be considered equally available.
See State v. Collins, supra note 24.
28. Seyle v. State, supra note 1, at 1086.
29. MCCORMICK § 272.
30. Hickman v. Pace, 82 N.J. Super 483. 198 A.2d 123 (1964).
24.
25.
26.
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one step further. He suggests that the failure of both parties
to produce an equally available witness should be open to an
inference against both parties; either party should be permitted to argue the inference against the adversary. 3 ' Seyle, to
be sure, does not reach this far, but the point is well taken.
The decision as to whether a witness is equally available in
McCormick's sense is, as one might suppose, nearly always
debatable. Hence, the determination, especially if the question is quite close, can be easily and safely left to the jury.32
This position received its most articulate support in United
3
States v. Cotter,'
a mail fraud case in which Judge Learned
Hand observed that "an inference is, strictly speaking,
always proper against each side, but of different weight."3 4
Furthermore, both inferences would be admissible as evidence under McCormick's basic test for relevancy. 5 That an
inference equally disfavors both parties, or seems to, need
not render it devoid of persuasive value.
Use of the missing witness rule is forbidden in other situations as well. Comment is prohibited if the testimony
would have been either irrelevant 6 or culmulative,37 or if the
missing witness is outside the court's jurisdiction-equally
unavailable to both parties. 3 Nor is the inference permitted

if the witness is incompetent to testify in behalf of the party
against whom the inference is sought.3 9 "Disqualifications"
such as the latter, however, have all but disappeared, especially spousal disqualifications. 0 Coke's assertion that a wife
cannot be a witness "for or against her husband, quia sunt
duae animae in carnae una, ",41 has proven entirely too broad,
if not rather silly. In England, the Evidence Amendment Act
31.

MCCORMICK § 272.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

MCCORMICK § 272. A growing number of jurisdictions are adopting this method of
analysis. See Note, supra note 18. at 339 n.13.
United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932).
Id at 692.
McCoRmicK at § 184.
Note, supra note 18, at 338.
State v. Heiser, 183 Neb. 665, 163 N.W.2d 582 (1968).
Id. at 585.
2 WIGMORE § 286. See also Graves v. United States, supra note 17.
Note the distinction between disqualification and privilege: disqualification is the
absolute bar against testifying for another. Privilege, on the other hand, is the right
not to be compelled to testify against another, and is waived if not asserted. See
Note, Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases, 19 Wyo. L. J. 35 (1964-1965).

41.

COKE, A COMMENTARIE ON LITTLETON (1928), cited in 2 WIGMORE § 2227. Coke is here

asserting that a spouse is incompetent to testify because husband and wife are actually one person-despite separate bodies. Wigmore, of course disagreeing with
this observation, states that Code "mouthed a few words of medieval scholasticism,
and suggested a consideration doubtful in its morality and narrow in its view of
human nature." 2 WIGMORE § 2228.
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of 1853 abolished the disqualification of the spouse of the defendant.4 2 The U.S. Supreme Court, overruling prior decisions, held in 1933 that a wife is competent to testify for her
husband when he is a defendant in any criminal case.' Wyo-

ming permits husband and wife to be witnesses for each
other in both civil and criminal action "as though the relationship did not exist.'" The provision was enacted in
1899.46
Note finally, that such inferences cannot be used to
establish the elements of proof which constitute the prima
facie case.4 6 Nor is the missing witness rule applicable to the
defendant who produces no evidence at all.'7 Prosecutorial
comment on the exercise of a constitutional or statutory
privilege not to testify against another is never permitted, 8
and comment upon the failure of an accused to take the
stand in his own defense violates the privilege against selfincrimination by "making its assertion costly.' ' 49
The Seyle Reformulation
In Seyle v. State, the court modified Wyoming's missing
witness rule to permit prosecutorial comment "if the failure
to call a witness more naturally leads to an inference against
the defendant." 0 After this decision, parties to a criminal
proceeding need no longer confine their comments to cases in
which the witness is only available to the party charged with
non-production. The missing witness rule, having now shed
the limitations of Spears,"'is clearly more versatile.
42.
43.
44.

St. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83 (1853).
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 377 (1933).
WYo. STAT. § 1-142 (1957); WYO. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1977).

45.

REv. STAT. 1899, § 3681.

46.

People v. Ashley, 42 Cal.2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900
(1954).
47. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, 32 F.2d 209 (2d Cir.
1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 574 (1929).
48. MCCORMICK § 76. Wigmore nevertheless speculates that the propriety of the comment may depend upon who asserts the privilege. If it is independent of the party's
control, he agrees that the witness' claim of privilege should render any comment
improper. But if the privilege lies within the control of the party himself, Wigmore
suggests that the comment may be justified. He does, however, concede that the
p rivilege may be undermined-perhaps even destroyed-by indirection. See 2
WIGMORE

49.

50.
51.

§ 286.

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The federal courts have, since 1878, forbidden comment on the failure of the defendant to take the stand in his own behalf. See
20 Stat. 30 (1878), now 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1971). Griffin, however, made the so-called
"no comment rule" a constitutional imperative.
Seyle v. State, supra note 1, at 1086.
See, supra notes 19 & 20.
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At first blush, this modification may seem insignificant,
at least with regard to Seyle. Under the old rule, a prosecutor
could comment on the defendant's failure to call his wife to
the stand, if appropriate, in a broad majority of cases, but he
is permitted to argue the inference under the new rule as
well. If, however, the facts in Seyle are analyzed with an eye
to the current law of marital privilege, the decision becomes
something more than a tempest in a teapot. Reversal on this
issue would have, in fact, dealt this evolving body of law a
stinging blow.
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES

52

AND CHILD ABUSE

HistoricalDevelopment of the Privilege
Coke's musings on spousal testimony have little contemporary relevance. As mentioned previously, the spouse
of the accused will rarely, if ever, be disqualified from testifying for the defense. And although Coke's reference to
spousal testimony was framed in absolute terms, it is now
generally held that the spouse of an accused is competent,
but cannot be compelled, to take the stand against the accused. 3 Some jurisdictions permit the privilege to be asserted by either spouse."5 The majority of jurisdictions including
Wyoming, 5 however, permit the privilege to be asserted by
the accused alone.56 A few jurisdictions do not recognize the
privilege at all."
In certain situations, the privilege is simply unavailable.
The spouse of the accused may, in most jurisdictions, testify
52.
53.
54.

55.

56.
57.

Privileged communications between married couples present other issues and are
beyond the scope of this discussion.
McCoaMICK § 66.
West Virginia, for example, permits either spouse to exercise the privilege. See W.
VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966). Rule 505(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence also allows
either spouse to claim the privilege, but the rule has not been enacted. There seems
to be some question as to whether a husband or wife may testify against his or her
accused spouse under the Federal Rules of Evidence in their present form. See McCORMICK §66 n. 53 (1978 Pocket Part).
WRE 501 indicates that the law of privilege shall be "governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the State of Wyoming
in light of reason and experience." The Wyoming cases that have dealt with the matter of spousal privileges indicate that the right to assert the privilege belongs to the
accused. See Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1960) and Pike v. State. 495
P.2d 1188 (Wyo. 1972).
See FED. R. Ev0D. 505 (Advisory Committee's Note).
In New York. the privilege applies only to confidential communications. N. Y.
EVIDENCE LAW § 4502(b) (1963).
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for the prosecution in proceedings for crimes committed by
one spouse against the other, objections by the defense notwithstanding. 8 Section 1-12-104 of the Wyoming Statutes
adopts this position. 9 And the Wyoming Supreme Court has
ruled, in Chamberlainv. State, that the language of the statute permits such testimony if the victim of the alleged crime
is the couple's minor child. 0 Such crimes offend both the
child and the child's parent-the spouse of the accused; the
spouse may therefore testify for the prosecution. But the actual interest is in the plight of the abused child.
The modern tendency is to question most marital privileges. McCormick refers to them as an "archiac survival of a
mystical religious doctrine.' '61 Today's marital relationship,
compared to that of Coke's era, has been rationalized, depolarized and dechivalrized; complete legal and political equality arguably calls the survival of spousal privileges against
adverse testimony into question. Justice Stewart, addressing the issue in Hawkins v. United States,621 asserted that
"(a)ny rule that impedes the discovery of justice impedes as
well the doing of justice.' '63 The draftsmen of the Model Code
of Evidence managed, in their deliberations, to limit the
scope of nearly every existing privilege, but the final draft
restated the law of privilege with no essential modifications. 5 Nor did the draftsmen of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, after a similar attempt, succeed in having any
noteworthy effect on the traditional privilege laws.66 The

passage of Section 1-12-104 seems, in retrospect, to have
67
been a rather fortunate event.
Disposition of the Issue in Seyle
In Seyle v. State, the defendant argued that comment by
the prosecutor on the exercise of a marital privilege constituted reversible error." That a prosecutor may not comment
58.
59.
60.

MCCORMICK § 66.
WYo. STAT. 1-12-104

66.

UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
WYO. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1977).

§
(1977).
Chamberlain v. State, supra note 56, at 284.
MCCORMICK § 66.
62. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
63. Id at 81.
64. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 187 (1941-1942).
65. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Forward, 17 (1942).
61.

67.
68.

501-512.

Brief for Appellant at 12.
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on the exercise of a privilege does, indeed, go practically
without question. 9 But in Seyle, the prosecution never attempted to put the defendant's wife on the stand; thus the
opportunity for the defendant to exercise his acknowledged
privilege never arose.70 If, as the court pointed out, no
privilege had been asserted, it could hardly have been violat7
ed. 1
But the defendant's point was not entirely without
merit. In cases in which the privilege continues to apply, the
defense must either call the defendant's spouse to the stand,
or suffer the adverse inference. 2 Thus, the failure of a
witness to testify on behalf of his or her spouse is tantamount to testifying against the spouse. The marital privilege
is effectively destroyed, although the opportunity to exercise it never arose. 3 This point was argued in State v. Brown,
which was cited by the defendant in his brief.74
The argument is, in any event, misplaced. Seyle is a
child abuse case; Chamberlainmade it abundantly clear that
the privilege is abrogated in such situations." Besides,
Brown itself has dubious precedential value. In Brown, the
Utah court observed that "(t)he cases are in hopeless confusion on whether, under what circumstances and statues,
7' 6
such comment on the failure to testify is prejudicial error.
The Utah bench, apparently nonplussed by the entire issue,
seems to have simply thrown up its hands; failing to cite any
precedent for its holdings. At any rate, the impropriety of
prosecutorial comment, absent the exercise of a privilege, is
said to be confined to instances in which the accused fails to
take the stand in his own defense." 7 This is in addition to the
circumstances in which such comments are deemed improper, discussed earlier.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

§ 76.
Seyle v. State, supra note 1, at 1084.
Id. at p. 1086. See also Brief for Appellee at 11.
Comment, Drawing an Inference from the Failureto Produce a Knowledgeable Witness: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1435
(1973).
State
v. Brown. 14 Utah 2d 324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963). McCormick argues that the
privilege
is not effectively destroyed. He notes that the privilege has its most practical benefit when it can impede a vital element of proof from getting to the jury. An
inference, however, cannot supply a lack of proof. See McCoRMIcK § 76.
Brief for Appellant at 13.
Chamberlain v. State, supra note 56.
State v. Brown, supra note 73, at 932.
Griffin v. California, supra note 49.
MCCORMICK
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At this point the two issues in the case, privilege and the
missing witness rule, finally intersect. Since, in Seyle v.
State, the accused was unable to rely on any privileges
against spousal testimony, his wife was "equally available"
to both the defense and the prosecution. In that situation,
the Spears rule would have prohibited any adverse comment.7 8 Seyle, however, removed this limitation.79 Because
the accused's wife, according to the defendant's testimony,
was present at the incident, his failure to call her, coupled
with his claim of innocence, formed the basis for a legitimate
inference. No more is required to call the rule into play.
Viewed from the perspective of the law of privilege, the
decision follows as a logical necessity. That is, had the court
not reversed Spears, the prosecution's chances of bringing
the inference to the jury would have arguably been better under a system of jurisprudence which in no circumstances permitted a wife to testify against her husband over his protestations. At least then she would have been peculiarly available in the Spears very rigid sense 0° And since the right of a
wife to testify against her husband for a "crime committed
by one against the other" existed at least as early as 1631,81
the prosecution, if forced to comply with the Spears formulation of peculiar availability, would probably fare better on
the issue if the case had been docketed a full three-hundred
and fifty-or more-years ago. Inconsistencies such as these
blatantly signal a need for change. In this era of general disenchantment with marital privileges82 but growing legal concern for the problems of abused youngsters,83 the constraints
imposed by the Spears missing witness rule seem, at best,
ironic.
QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY OF THE INFERENCE

Courts have, nevertheless, advised that the rule be ap78.
79.
80.
81.

State v. Spears, supra note 20.
Seyle v. State, supra note 1, at 1086.
See, supra note 19.
The first documented trace of this right to testify is in the case of Lord Audley's
Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 401, 402 (1631). There the English court resolved that the wife
might be a witness against her husband for rape upon her, instigated by him,
because she was the party wronged.
82. MCCORMICK, § 66, § 86.
83. See, Symposium: JuvenileJustice, 57 B. L. REV. 617 (1977), and also A Symposium:
The Medical, Legislatureand Legal Aspects of ChildAbuse and Neglec 23 VILL. L.
REV. 445 (1978) for an overview of the contemporary legal response to the problems
of child abuse.
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plied with caution." A party's failure to produce a witness is

by its very nature ambiguous.8 5 The non-producing party
may, for example, fear that the witness, if called, would be

impeached because of his criminal record, that the person's
appearance or demeanor would adversely affect the jury, or

that the potential witness is just too unreliable to call. 6 Perhaps an explanation to the jury of the witness' absence from

the stand, even if the jury were previously instructed to disregard the adverse comment, would be ineffective. McCor-

mick's remedy for fallacious argument, "the answering argument and the jury's good sense,''87 is hardly fail-safe. Fur-

thermore, the possibility that the inference may be drawn invites waste of time in calling unnecessary witnesses,8 8 al-

though evidence offered to explain the failure of the witness
to testify would probably save all parties needless problems

ahead.8 9

Such shortcomings, if dealt with at all, are generally
dealt with in one of two ways. First, the court may simply

disallow the inference by its customary and individualized
set of rules. Prohibition of an inference is always within the

court's discretion.9" Secondly, use of the inference may be
forbidden by statute. In Missouri, for example, the failure of

a criminal defendant to avail himself of the testimony of his
spouse may "(n)ot be referred to by any attorney in the case,

nor be considered by the court or jury before whom the trial
takes place."9 ' New Jersey's approach to the issue, however,
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

90.

91.

McCosMicK § 272. See also Jenkins v. Bierschenk, 333 F.2d 421,425 (8th Cir. 1964).
In a lawsuit arising out of an automobile mishap, the defendant did not call as a
witness his own son, who had been in a previous accident with the defendant's car.
The father-son relationship would arguably have permitted the adverse inference,
but the court ruled that argument of the inference was impermissible. The court
quoted Shoenberg v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 1962):
We adhere to our comment that any rule creating a presumption (sic) of
this kind is to be applied with caution and we agree with the trial court
that 'there must be a reason for such a supposition, and a factual area
within which it may legally operate. The supposition must rise above the
level of a mere possibility ..
Id
Comment, supra note 72, at 1426.
MCCORMICK § 272.
Id In Ballard v. Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co., 33 Wis.2d 601, 148 N.W.2d 65, 73
(1967) the court observed that "[a] party to a lawsuit does not have the burden, at
his peril, of calling every possible witness to a fact, lest his failure to do so will result
in an inference against him."
The comment is evidently permitted even if the party charged with non-production
offers an explanation as to the witness' whereabouts. In People v. Saltz, 131 C.A.2d
459, 280 P.2d 900 (1955), the prosecution was permitted to argue that the alibi offered by the defense, considering all the evidence, was simply a myth.
McCoRMICK § 272.
See W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966) and e1so Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.270 (1949).
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is a bit more novel. In State v. Clawans,92 a case in which an
attorney was accused of inducing a witness to commit perjury,93 the court suggested that the party seeking to obtain a
charge on an adverse inference first advise the trial judge
and opposing counsel of his intent 'o do so, at the close of his
opponent's case. The non-producing party would then have
the opportunity to either call the designated witness or give
some explanation of the failure to call. The trial court's determination of the propriety of the inference
would depend
9 4
upon the circumstances thus disclosed.
The foregoing suggestion was cast in the form of dictum, but it nevertheless deserves consideration. There has,
in the fairly recent past, been a shift away from the notion
that criminal proceedings are "adversary" in nature. The
current trend, for example, has been both to de-emphasize
and discourage the surprise element in litigation. McCormick's statement that "the availability of modern discovery
procedures serves to diminish both the justification and the
need for the (adverse) inference" may have been something
of an overstatement," but the fact remains that discovery is
now available to parties to a criminal action. 6 This contemporary attitude is, in any event, embodied as well in the
Federal Rules of Evidence; Rules 803 (24) and 804(b)(5) indicated that any uses of hearsay not included in the many exceptions contained in the Rules must be preceded by timely
notice to the adverse party. Thus, the Clawans suggestion
that notice be given is not without precedent. But more importantly, it is in keeping with the spirit of modern criminal
litigation, despite the fact that this spirit seems at times to
be confined largely to the realm of the ideal.
A Clawans-type approach would, however, be more
useful in some circumstances than in others. The party considering the use of the inference will probably have made inquiry into the possibility of the missing witness' genuine unavailability, since comment on the failure of a particular witness to testify who is beyond the reach of the court's subpoena power is commonly held to be reversible error. If the
92.
93.
94.
95.

96.

38 N.J. 162, 183 A.2d 77 (1962).
Id at 78.
Id at 82.
MICCORMICK § 272.
MCCORMICK § 3
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witness is found to be truly unavailable, the need for notice,
and of course the opportunity for comment, will simply have
been obviated. It seems, rather, that notice would perform
its most useful service when the missing witness' testimony
would have been either irrelevant or cumulative, or if, for
some other reason, the comment would have plainly been out
of order. Notice in these situations could significantly reduce
the number of appeals based on the missing witness issue.
There are, to be sure, those who would balk at the suggestion put forth in Clawans. The possibility always exists
that the non-producing party, either deliberately or by way
of oversight, will have withheld valuable evidence by not
producing a key witness. Opposition to the Clawans approach is thus understandable, especially in situations of the
latter type; notice in those instances would bestow upon the
withholding party the luxury of an eleventh-hour warning-and, in effect, reward carelessness or ignorance. And as
to the situation in which an unreliable witness is kept from
the stand, the argument that the non-producing party must
"live with its choice" not to call a particular witness surely
has merit.
The party who wishes to argue the inference would, in
other words, be placed in the position of having to force his
opponent's hand. Once notice is given, the party seeking to
invoke the inference will either have done his opponent the
favor of policing the opponent's case, or he will have scored a
"victory." Such a victory will manifest itself in one of two
ways: the party seeking the adverse comment will either be
permitted to make it (hardly a victory at all if courts have
traditionally permitted argument of the inference), or he will
have the opportunity to cross-examine the withheld witness.
Notice, regardless of the result, introduces into the litigation
an added element of risk. That is, the party seeking to comment may simply lose the opportunity to do so. Conversely,
if the commenting party is victorious, the right to crossexamine an unreliable or unpredictable witness may result in
a mere Phyrric victory. Some will naturally find these risks
distressing.
On the other hand, the language of the preceding
paragraph admits too much of the pugilist-deliberately so.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979
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To reiterate, the ideal of modern criminal procedure is truth,
not combativeness. That being the case, notice would probably be more beneficial than burdensome. It would serve,
first of all, to spread more evidence, both favorable and unfavorable, before the trier of fact. Secondly, it would very
possibly prevent unnecessary appeals. The Clawans approach is undeniably solicitous of the withholding party, but
at this point in legal history the interests of justice seem to
demand the use of this and similar protective measures.
The Clawans court did not, however, discuss precomment notice in anything resembling categorical terms.
Even to this day, notice in such situations appears not to be
a requirement in New Jersey. But if it were, it is reasonable
to suspect that some sort of penalty would attach to the failure to provide notice. This "remedy" issue presents its own
set of problems. To limit the possibility of a new trial to
cases in whch the missing witness is genuinely unavailable is
actually a rather meaningless approach: in those situations
counsel would probably have committed reversible error regardless of the notice requirement. As mentioned previously,
this particular issue would present itself on appeal only on
the rarest of occasions, since counsel would hopefully have
inquired into the whereabouts of the missing witness at
some earlier point.
A second alternative is automatic reversal and remand
for any failure to give notice-reversal per se. This seems inordinately generous. It also places an invaluable trump card
in the hand of the appellant, especially if the absence of his
witness from the stand was a careless oversight. On the
other hand, to leave the question of whether the error is
reversible entirely to the discretion of the court leaves
almost as much to the desired. Appellate courts would probably reverse only in situations in which they would have
reversed in the pre-notice era-in situations in which the
testimony of the witness would have been irrelevant, cumulative, etc. That being the case, the notice requirement
would be essentially without meaning. In fact, it is reasonable to suspect that prosecutors would intentionally ignore a
notice requirement if the risk that a verdict in their favor
would not be overturned on appeal appeared to be worth takhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/9
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ing. Hence, the net effect of the notice requirement would
probably not be to increase the number of new trials in cases
involving missing witnesses and comments thereon. It may,
however, reduce the number of appeals dealing with the issue. More than anything else, the effectiveness of a notice requirement would have to depend upon the willingness of the
courts to consider it seriously and enforce it consistently.
One recent critic's remarks on the missing witness rule
are especially worthy of note. In Wynn v. United States97 a
federal circuit court suggested that in order to raise a similar
inference against a criminal defendant, the record should
show the extent of the non-producing party's knowledge of
the witness' whereabouts at the time of the trial, whether the
witness was within the jurisdiction, and whether the State
had the opportunity to call the absent witness either before
or during the trial.9" This position is very reminiscent of the
traditional notion that comment be prohibited if the witness
is "equally available" to both parties in the literal sense.
Such a rule would significantly limit the number of criminal
cases in which the adverse comment might be invoked. Commenting on the suggestion, one critic observed that "(i)n
light of the presumption of innocence, this restriction on the
application of the rule and the resulting pressure on the government to rely on its own efforts to produce affirmative evidence seems proper." 99
The court's recommendation is well-meaning, but both
the recommendation and the critic's observations are problematical. If the goal, as previously noted, is to ferret out all
pertinent facts. This would undeniably aid in clearing up the
ambiguity. However, the critic's reliance on the notion of
any "presumption of innocence" in making her point is actually misplaced. No inherent probability exists that a criminal defendant is innocent; the term is best labeled a
misnomer. There is perhaps an "assumption of innocence,"
in the sense that in the absence of facts to the contrary, it
should be assumed that a person's conduct on a given occasion is lawful. 00 The inclusion of the phrase in the legal
97.
98.
99.
100.

397 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Id at 625 & n. 23.
Comment, supra note 72, at 1428 n. 27.
MCCORMICK

§342.
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jargon is, thus, better described as an amplification of the
prosecutor's overall burden of persuasion. 10
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Given these observations, the use of the adverse inference can very conceivably be justified. A prosecutor's
burden is, of course, weighty, but not quite as weighty as the
critic has suggested. It is true that the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts of its case.' °2 But
it is also true that the inference which rises from the failure
to produce is persuasive rather than probative; that is, it
merely adds weight to the invoking party's claim. 03 These
observations are not to suggest that because the inference
has a minor part to play in the legal process it should not be
a matter of anything but the most minimal concern. They are
merely to point out that the failure to call a witness who
might naturally be expected to take the stand-one within
the jurisdiction and able to testify-must be of some persuasive value, albeit at times slight. Sometimes the failure to
call a witness has little significance; at other times the
failure is imbued with troublesome implications. The latter
may be the case regardless of the fact that the party seeking
the inference has not chosen to call the witness to the stand.
And since such conspicuous absences are correctly considered to have evidentiary significance, it thus seems
logical that the burden of dispelling the legitimate suspicion
should lie with the party charged with non-production. In
fact, the notice rule discussed earlier would at the same time
it safeguards any misuse of the adverse comment guarantee
that the interests of fact ascertainment, our current concern,
are served. The witness would either be produced or the
withholding party would suffer the adverse inference, but
the burden of production would not be placed on the party
whose only desire is to argue a concededly legitimate inference.
It must, at the risk of belaboring the point, be admitted
that this allocation of the burden to exonerate appears to
place the criminal defendant on the offense. The party arguing the inference, as the critic suggests, has actually produced nothing. Conversely, the non-producing party must, it
101. id.
102. People v. Ashley, supra note 46, at 285.
103. Id.
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seems, vindicate himself of the unfavorable innuendo-possibly a difficult task if the opportunity to call the vindicating
witness has already come and gone. At least with regard to
this issue, a criminal defendant may seem to have been
deemed "guilty until proven innocent."
However, comment on the failure to produce a witness is
not a comment on "nothing." The inference, recall, is drawn
from "conduct evidence," not from an utter lack of evidence.
Thus, evidence presented at any stage of the proceeding to
fend off the inference is actually made in defense.
CONCLUSION

The decison in Seyle v. State was both a logical and,
from the standpoint of jurisprudence, an historical necessity. Since the missing witness need no longer be available
solely to the non-producing party, valid inferences, once silenced by the rule in State v. Spears, may now find a place in
the closing argument. And the particular facts of this case,
the death of a battered infant, highlight the need for such a
change.
Juries deliberate on facts; all that is neither irrelevant or
prejudicial, as Judge Learned Hand has indicated, is that
which the jury should use.'0 4 The decision in Seyle v. State is
in keeping with this fundamental rule.
KATHLEEN

104.

A. HEMPELMAN

United States v. Cotter, supra note 26, at 692.
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